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Ladies and Gentlemen:
The centennial anniversary of the loss
of the USS F-1 occurs on Sunday, 17 December 2017. This is important
in the history of the US Naval Submarine Force as it is the first
loss of a US submarine during a declared war. Being so it then
should be remembered that there are fifty three US submarines lost
during wartime not the fifty two that only counts those lost during
the US involvement in World War Two. For the past seventy seven
years the history of our force has been remembered wrong. It is time
for that egregious error be corrected.
It has been said to me by way of
argument that the loss of F-1 was only an accident. This is true but
so also were the losses of USS S-28, USS S-36, USS S-39 and R-12.
It has been said to me by way of
argument that the loss of F-1 was not in a 'combat zone'. The west
coast of the US was as much of a combat zone as the waters off Hawaii
in 1944 and the waters off Key West in June of 1943.
These two arguments also logically
argue that S-28 and R-12 should be removed from the list of fifty two
submarines lost in World War Two. This then would need a revision of
history to reflect the number of wartime US submarine losses to an
even fifty.
Rather than be exclusive it would seem
to be a better way to remember the sacrifices of our submarine
sailors to be inclusive. Thus the actual number of wartime losses in
the US Naval Submarine Force should be fifty three.
The details of the loss of F-1 are
described below:
The US Navy's First Wartime Submarine
Loss
The distance from San Pedro Bay to La
Jolla in California is roughly 75 nautical miles. A course
connecting Point Fermin, the southern point of the Palos Verde Hills
with Point Loma is 142°T, The reciprocal then would be 322°T.
To transit between these two points, one would go south on 142° and
to come back one would steer 322°
In a smooth sea the F-Class submarine
could make the trip in about 8 hours at just less than 10 knots.
Naval Instructions require that ships perform and engineering test to
determine both the stamina of a ship and her capabilities. Both
must be known to plan strategy. The test for submarines was to
run at a constant standard speed for 48 hours. The test would
see how far the ship could go in the requisite time. Slowing or
stopping for repairs would count against the ship's performance and
reflect poorly on the ship and crew. The best a ship could do,
then, was to maintain a constant fairly high speed for the entire
time. To do a 48 hour engineering test would require six trips
for the F-boats, three south from San Pedro toward San Diego
and three back to the north..
In December 1917, the USS F-1, USS F-3
and USS F-2 found themselves making just such a test. In the
five months since the United States entered World War I on the side
of the Allied Powers, the US Naval Submarine Force had been thrust
into an unfamiliar role. Instead of combating enemy fleets
trying to force our coast, they boats were performing anti-submarine
warfare patrols off the east coast of the US and off the Azores.
There was little threat to the west coast so the remaining boats
there were mostly holding training exercises.
The F-class submarine was designed in
the early 1900s when the role of the submarine was still very
much in its infancy. Electric Boat offered the General Board
several designs in 1909. These were the EB-18, EB-19 and
EB-20. They were variations on the theme put forth by EB in its
C and D Classes. Slightly longer than the D Class, EB-18 used
gasoline engines for propulsion and had one more periscope. The
EB-19 design was essentially the same, but with diesel engines.
Both were too slow, the board required 14kts the -18 and -19 designs
were rejected. The EB-20 design came in two varieties, diesel
and gasoline.
Only the diesel powered EB-20B would
make the requisite 14 kts. It was be accepted and four boats were
built, all on the west coast. These for boats would
be the F-class, USS F-1, USS F-2, USS F-3 and USS F-4.
The class were all single hulled boats
with circular sections laid along the same axis. Their length
overall was 142'-6". Their beam was a mere 15'-5".
The hull was divided into three compartments; the torpedo room
with the breech ends of the four 18 inch torpedo tubes, the
control room with the operators for the ballast control valves
(Kingstons), hydroplanes and periscopes, and the engine room
with two diesel engines their dynamos and shafting. The diesel
engines of the F-class couldn't be reversed so shaft reversal (or
backing down) took a bit of time. The engine had to be
shut down, the clutch between the engine and the main motor
disengaged then the main motor started in the astern direction.
The two 390 horsepower diesel engines were connected by a clutch and
common shaft to 310 horsepower motors which could be used as
generators for battery charging. The battery was a collection
of 120 Excide cells in rubber lined steel jars. The cells were
open topped and prone to leak acid into the bilge space under them.
The diesels were generally unreliable and required constant
maintenance. The motors were of the open yoke type and were
suceptable to electrical grounding in the damp atmosphere of
the engine/motor room. The F-class and the sister class, the E,
were the first EB boats to have bow planes. The fledgling
submarine fleet also had the first shipboard radios on submarines.
Those in the F boats were made by Finekey. (One wonders if that
is the origin of the colloquial term that means hard to maintain).
The class was involved in several
incidents, not all good. F-2 had set a record on a dive on 5
September 1912 when she went to a depth of 283 feet, some 83 feet
below her test depth"(breaking the G-1's record 256'). Lt
James B. Howell, her CO was censured for the test.
F-4 failed to come up after a routine
dive off Honolulu harbor on 15 March 1915. It was the
first time the US Navy had lost a submarine and its crew. Great
efforts were made to reach the ship and rescue the crew, but she was
in 300 feet of water and there was no hope. The hull was
finally raised the next year. Investigation determined that the
cause of the sinking was a structural failure of the forward battery
well due to acid leakage from the batteries. This sulfuric acid
electrolyte had, over a period of time, caused heavy corrosion of
rivets on tank seams which, in their weakened state failed and caused
flooding of the ship. The hull was eventually placed in a deep
trench some 40 feet off wharf position Serria-14 on the north
side of the submarine base at Pearl Harbor where she still resides.
F-2 ran into the underside of a
kelp barge in August 1917, tearing off the radio antenna and the
upper section of #1 scope. In October, the H-1 smacked the F-2
as the former came alongside. Hitting along frame 55, H-1
started rivets and opened seams for 40 to 50:" above the
waterline along an area between frames 56 and 39. Then in
November, K-7 hit F-2 forward and started rivets from frame 10 to
14. All these insults had been repaired by mid December.
They seemed to be sturdy boats and with the exception of F-4, safe
boats.
Fog is a common factor off the
California coast in winter. The plan for the engineering run
included contingency of turning to seaward in case of running into
restricted visibility. The engineering run started on the
morning of 17 December 1917. The first leg was a run to the
south with a course reversal with La Jolla light abeam to
port. The three ships formed a rough line abreast and
started south. The engines were running smoothly at abour 292
RPM. The engines were direct drive to the screw and at this
speed, the boats made about 10 knots. There was likely a
current to the south of about two knots so the speed "over the
ground" was nearer 12 knots. The run south was uneventful
throughout the day and as the afternoon wore on, the line abreast was
slightly ragged. F-2 was to seaward standing to the south on
course 142°T about ten nautical miles off La Jolla light. F-3
was two point forward of the F-2's port beam at a range of about 7000
yards. F-1 was about 2000 yards astern of F-3 on a bearing of
007°T from F-3.
Sunset occured about 1630 the evening
of 17 December 1917 and it was fully dark abour 1715.
The orders to the flotilla were to maintain speed as per the
engineering run plan on course 142°T until abeam of La Jolla light
then to stand out to sea to avoid fog then to come around to such a
course that would bring them to San Pedro by about 1000 the next
morning. The ships were, even though together, were operating
independently, not in formation. Each ship was to inform the
others of course changes and speed changes. Each of the ships
cruised through the calm sea with running lights on.
The F-Class had been designed without
a bridge as we see on later submarines. The crews had a pipe
and rail rig made up to which a canvas screen was lashed.
This provided some protection from the wind and occasional spray.
The captain " " and the Officer of the Deck " "
were on the bridge as well as two lookouts. "" was in
the connning tower. Engine orders were shouted down the hatch
to the connning tower. There was a helm stand on the bridge that
connected via a linkage through the hull to the internal steering
stand. Air was being drawn into the ship for the engines
through the air induction and through the conning tower hatch.
All seemed routine but the Captain was aware of the impending danger
of nightime maneuver near land in the fog and at night.
About 1830, the ships began to run
into fog that soon became thick.. F-1 changed course to 165°T
to stand away from La Jolla and Point Loma. Being the aft most
ship, she would pass astern of F-3. A radio message was sent to
indicate the course change but it was evidently not received by
either of F-1's companions. The OOD of F-2
was mindful of the two ships on his port hand. At 1855 he
turned F-2 to the west to clear the fog and to clear the area into
which F-1 and F-3 would maneuver. F-2 would stand out to sea clear of
the fog then turn north for the return trip along course 322°
Just after 1900 F-3 put on 10° right rudder and began a turn to a
reciprocal course of 322°. The intention was to reverse
course, run to the north out of the fog and back toward San Pedro.
The assumption made was that F-1 was still to port and astern.
F-3' s radio operator started to try to raise F-1 and F-2 on the
radio to inform them of the course change and intentions.
F-3 was coming slowly about and was
crossing 310° when, at about 1912, her lookouts and OOD sighted the
masthead and port running light of another ship closing at a combined
speed of nearly 20 knots. The OOD screamed for F-3's helmsman
to put her rudder hard over to turn faster to starboard
and for the engines to be reversed. The other ship was
crossing F-3's bow from starboard to port. The other ship was
F-1 running to the south on 165° Seeing the lights of
F-3 looming out of the fog, F-1's skipper tried to come to
starboard. The combination of efforts was too slow to do
anything but make the collision worse by placing the ships at more of
a right angle. The resulting collision was deadly.
F-3 struck F-1 on the port side
some 15' aft of the shears near the bulkhead between control and the
engine room. The stiff stem of F-3 and the rounded torpedo tube
bow cap punched a three foot wide by ten foot high hole in the upper
hull of F-1 driving all the way into the superstructure. F-1
rolled to starboard throwing all four men who were on the small
canvas and pipe bridge into the sea. F-3 pulled out of the hole
with the screws reversed. Not being pushed anymore, F-1
rolled back to port and started to flood fast. The man in
F-1's conning tower, seeing the water coming in below him
climbed out and went overside. No one else escaped. Someone in
the engine room tried to open the hatch to get out but the ship
was sinking fast and water pressure on the outside kept it shut until
it was too late. Those in the forward end of the boat had no
chance. Nineteen men went down with the ship. The five
in the water were picked up by F-3 and she made her way back to
San Pedro.
In October, 1975, the USNS De Steiguer
(T-AGOS-12) was using some new equipment to search for an F-4J
aircraft known to have crashed in the sea off Point Loma. Her
side scan sonar spotted what appeared to be a submarine in 635' of
water. The hull was photographed by CURV II and again on 24
October 1975 by DSRV-2. It was positively identified as F-1.
The boat is laying on its starboard side with the hole made by F-3
clearly visible. The hull is in amazingly good shape and serves
as deep gravesite for the US Naval Submarine Force's first
wartime submarine loss.
We should be changing all references to
the number of wartime losses in the US Submarine Force to fifty three
as the number of fifty two is just wrong.
Very Respectfully
Jim Christley EMCS(SS) USN(ret)
St Augustine, FL
------------- Be Well Oldsubs
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